Part 4: Strategic portfolio

4.4
We have assessed NZDMO against five key criteria for ensuring a robust risk management framework within Parts 4 and 5 of this report. Identification and management of operational risk (assessment of the control framework) is not normally considered separately. However, given the technical nature of the review, we have chosen to assess financial risk and operational risk in separate sections.

Background

Portfolio structure

4.5
NZDMO currently has two main portfolio groups – a strategic portfolio and a tactical portfolio.

4.6
The strategic portfolio provides funding to agencies of the Government. Financial assets will not always match the financial liabilities within this portfolio. The Government bears zero net interest cost for NZDMO’s “matched liabilities” (non-market bonds) issued to other major New Zealand public investment institutions. However, there are also unmatched financial liabilities (New Zealand dollar debt). These are, in effect, a debt pool. The Government will continue to bear the long-term costs of funds from this pool.

4.7
To the extent that a New Zealand bond issue has not been allocated to a tactical or quasi-tactical portfolio, the debt will be typically allocated to the strategic portfolio. If funds are not immediately required, the funds are left in the Crown Settlement Account earning the Overnight Cash Rate. The composition of the portfolio is therefore an outcome of not being able to allocate any residual portions of debt issues to corresponding financial assets.

4.8
Once debt (and any associated derivatives) has been allocated to the strategic portfolio, these financial instruments will normally be held to maturity. Financial instruments in this portfolio are currently accounted for on an accruals basis under New Zealand generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP). The intention of NZDMO is that a significant portion of this portfolio will be accounted for on a mark-to-market basis under New Zealand equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards (NZ IFRS). This accounting policy is based on management and reporting of the portfolio on a fair value basis.

4.9
The strategic portfolio also incorporates a quasi-tactical portfolio associated with on-lending to New Zealand government agencies. The quasi-tactical portfolio has a degree of active management.

4.10
Risk metrics are calculated for the two recently developed quasi-tactical portfolios within the strategic portfolio. However, the level of risk analytics undertaken within the tactical portfolio is not applied to the rest of the strategic portfolio.

4.11
The strategic portfolio does not have a target duration or duration benchmark. While not policy, the Technical Appendix to the PMP document indicates that the duration of NZDMO debt should, historically, have been relatively long. In principle, NZDMO now looks to match its debt to the duration of selected financial assets on the Crown balance sheet.

4.12
NZDMO does not currently set a fixed/floating mix target for the domestic debt portfolio. Our analysis suggests that the domestic portfolio is currently close to 30% floating interest rate exposure – with 10% from treasury bills and 15% from interest rate swaps.

4.13
The quasi-tactical portfolio is reported upon in terms of Value added Risk (VaR), but does not have a risk limit. If circumstances are appropriate, NZDMO may move this sub-portfolio to the tactical portfolio.

Designation of portfolios

4.14
In our opinion, the current designation of portfolios as strategic and tactical is somewhat ambiguous for parties that are not fully acquainted with NZDMO’s current mode of operations. Many risk management practitioners would consider tactical risk management akin to proprietary trading or at least active management. The description of the tactical portfolio in the PMP is consistent with this latter interpretation.

4.15
Since the last significant rewrite of the PMP in 2003, NZDMO’s trading philosophy has shifted from outright proprietary trading to a more transaction flow or balance sheet driven style. In discussions with NZDMO staff , they referred to “traded” and “non-traded” risk. Such a description provides a better insight into the nature of the current portfolios and is consistent with financial institutions’ diff erentiation between asset and liability management activities (non-traded) and markets activities (traded).

4.16
We suggest that NZDMO consider redesignating portfolios/sub-portfolios in terms of traded (tactical portfolio) and non-traded risk (strategic portfolio). This could assist parties outside NZDMO to understand NZDMO’s portfolio structure, the purpose of portfolios, and the rationale for the current portfolio structure.

Strategic debt portfolio

4.17
The Crown has reduced gross debt from around 50% of GDP (the OECD average) to close to 25% of GDP in little more than 10 years. While aspects of the strategic portfolio have been driven by fiscal surpluses, NZDMO’s performance has further enhanced improvements with respect to minimising finance costs and volatility (or risk).

4.18
In the early 1990s, the dollar value of gross debt was close to $50,000 million and the cost of borrowing was more than $4,400 million a year or 9%. More recently, gross debt has reduced to just over $30,000 million and overall financing costs to around $2,500 million per year or less than 7%. Key decisions supporting performance in recent years have included reducing net foreign currency debt to zero, discontinuing the issue of inflation bonds, and introducing interest rate swap hedging. The latter has assisted in reducing the cost of funds for NZDMO in six out of the last seven years by between 2 and 20 basis points.

4.19
The improved fiscal position of the New Zealand Government, combined with the financial market environment, has ensured that the relative cost of borrowing for New Zealand is quite favourable on an international basis.

4.20
By way of comparison, we compared the swap spread of New Zealand to that of like-rated sovereign borrowers (“AA+”) and also “AAA” rated countries. Our analysis is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4
Average 5-year swap spreads for New Zealand and like-rated sovereign countries (for 2000-06)

Source: Bloomberg

4.21
This analysis highlights the ability of the New Zealand Government to achieve financing costs substantially below the swap interest rate (the wholesale market reference interest rate) when compared to similar rated countries. This analysis suggests that “AA+” type sovereign borrowers could borrow at about 10-20 basis points below the reference market rate.

4.22
When comparing New Zealand to the highest credit rating, “AAA”, which includes many of the Western European countries, the New Zealand Government still has greater borrowing advantage (in terms of swap spread) than most “AAA” rated countries. It is only countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Norway that achieve similar swap spread margins.

Portfolio Management Policy

General observations

4.23
Aside from several updates for operational changes, NZDMO’s Portfolio Management Policy (PMP) has not had a fundamental rewrite since 2003. Since then, both the activities and market environment in which NZDMO operates have continued to change substantially. NZDMO’s activities have moved away from significant discretionary risk management activities. NZDMO is now operating in an environment where it has significant excess liquidity and where the yield curve of New Zealand Government debt trades at 80 to 100 basis points below the interest rate swap curve.

4.24
NZDMO recognises that the PMP needs revision. It has acknowledged that the policy should reflect current practice rather than theoretical best practice. NZDMO plans to update the policy when resources allow.

4.25
The PMP contains a high proportion of guidance around contextual issues, but less guidance on operational application of the asset and liability framework/ philosophy. For example, within the section on funding, the PMP says that “NZDMO will establish a relatively even maturity profile for terms of debt”. This is consistent with good practice, but it is unclear what this means in actual practice. It is stated in another section of the PMP that the NZDMO has the right to use options. However, the PMP is silent about whether options can only be bought, or whether they can also be sold. In practice, NZDMO does not use options, and has indicated that further Ministerial approval would be required before using them. This is inconsistent with what the PMP currently states.

4.26
Several reasons are provided within the PMP as to why NZDMO should undertake tactical trading, including “tactical trading brings with it knowledge of how various markets operate under a variety of circumstances, which improves NZDMO’s understanding in managing the overall portfolio”. The discretion to actively manage risk is provided through a VaR limit and the asset and liability framework or philosophy.

4.27
The PMP needs to be revised to reflect current philosophies. Better practice is to review treasury policies on an annual basis. The revision of the PMP document will provide the opportunity to better reflect actual practice as well as consider revised risk management practices within the PMP, particularly those associated with:

• interest rate risk;
• foreign exchange risk;
• risk measurement;
• funding risk; and
• liquidity risk.

Recommendation 5

We recommend that NZDMO update its Portfolio Management Policy to synchronise the policy’s principles and management strategies with current business practices and goals. In particular, consideration should be given to expanding the Portfolio Management Policy by including the policies used to support the principles and limits in the document while retaining a Portfolio Management Policy that is clear and understandable.

4.28
We suggest that NZDMO gives attention to making the PMP document more concise and specific.

Funding risk

4.29
Funding risk is currently considered to be low given the demand for New Zealand government bonds and the significant liquidity reserves that NZDMO holds. NZDMO is also targeting an issuance programme of up to $2,500 million a year to maintain liquidity in its benchmark stocks.

4.30
In effect, NZDMO is managing funding risk by continuing to maintain its domestic bond programme and through the general objective of maintaining a relatively even maturity profile for benchmark stock issues.

4.31
Other relevant issues that could be considered by NZDMO include a policy of facilitating secondary market activities through stock lending and repurchase (“repo”) activities.

4.32
Currently, the PMP has portfolio maturity profile limits of $3,500 million a year (or implicitly between 2% and 3% of GDP) for domestic debt and $1,500 million a year for foreign currency debt. We consider that there is little value in specifying maximum maturities for each period, the average term of debt, or other parameters in the policy, given that the NZDMO’s:

• current liquidity holdings are significant;
• entire foreign currency debt portfolio is close to $1,500 million; and
• debt maturity profile is relatively balanced and spread over 10 years.

Liquidity risk

4.33
NZDMO told us that the current PMP is geared around maintaining adequate liquidity to ensure that NZDMO can meet its foreign currency obligations. NZDMO believes it is no longer appropriate to have the policy focused on foreign currency obligations. We agree that NZDMO’s liquidity policy should consider NZDMO’s overall obligations.

4.34
The policy could consider crisis liquidity and normal liquidity requirements for NZDMO. However, in the current circumstances (of excess liquidity and high demand for New Zealand Government debt), this may not add significant value. It may be sufficient for the next policy revision to specify a minimum liquidity holding with an associated trigger for action. This may entail NZDMO ensuring that it has sufficient liquid assets to meet all near term liabilities if the liquidity portfolio falls below a minimum level.

4.35
A minimalist approach, as described above, would require at least a statement of intention for managing liquidity risk as well as any rules that would trigger action. In general, we consider that the approach and framework taken is in line with industry practice.

4.36
We agree with recent proposed changes to the policy regarding inconsistencies in methodology. These changes represent better practice. In particular, the shift in treating derivative transactions on an individual rather than aggregated basis is a notable improvement.

Market risks

4.37
While foreign exchange and interest risk exposures fall within the VaR policy limits, it is often useful to present additional foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk analysis. This enables management to review risk exposures at a more detailed level than is possible using the VaR limit alone, but without overlaying additional policy parameters on the portfolio managers.

Reputation risk

4.38
It is becoming more common for business organisations to state explicitly in policy what they consider to be the largest threats to their reputation and how they intend to manage such threats. Sources of such risks may be political, environmental, public liability, or economic, depending on the industries involved.

4.39
It may be instructive for NZDMO to consider defining such risks and including clauses relevant to reputational risk events and scenarios in its policy.

Processes and controls on instrument choice and deal execution

4.40
Debt managers typically prefer to concentrate borrowing activities on issuing longer-maturity fixed-rate domestic debt instruments to:

• minimise refinancing risks;
• stabilise debt-servicing costs;
• increase the investor base;
• increase the depth of the domestic bond market; and
• establish a pricing benchmark to help the market in pricing the credit of other domestic fixed-income issuers.¹

4.41
Sovereign borrowers generally prefer domestic fixed-interest debt over foreign currency debt and short-dated instruments. Unhedged foreign currency debt will typically increase the riskiness of the debt portfolio (through exchange rate risk) and potentially undermine the debt management framework. In this context, we assessed NZDMO’s choice of instruments within the strategic portfolio with respect to its influence on the debt portfolio.

4.42
International evidence indicates that OECD government borrowers typically use certain types of instruments. During the last 10 years, these borrowers have typically aimed to increase their debt portfolio duration, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5
Use of financial instruments by OECD government borrowers and by NZDMO (1995-2005)*

Instrument	Level of use within a range of OECD countries (% of total debt portfolio)	Level of use within NZDMO (% of total debt portfolio)
Short-term securities, mainly treasury bills	Minimum close to 0% and maximum around 63%.	NZDMO portfolio has historically been around 15%, but reduced to closer to 10% recently.
	Average moved down from around 20% to 10%.
Medium- or long-term fixed rate securities or notes	Minimum around 20% and maximum around 90%.	NZDMO portfolio has historically been around 80%.
	Average moved up from low 40% to 60%.
Foreign currency debt	Minimum 0% and maximum around 50%. Average 15%.	NZDMO portfolio has historically been around 15%, but reduced to closer to 5% recently.

* Information was sourced from the 2006 OECD Statistical Yearbook.

4.43
The types of instruments used by NZDMO are broadly consistent with international practice. Furthermore, the composition is similar to international public debt portfolio composition. The bulk of borrowing undertaken uses medium to long-term fixed rate securities (government bonds) and the residual instruments are a mix of short-term instruments and foreign currency debt.

4.44
In the 1990s, New Zealand issued $1,800 million of inflation bonds for a number of macroeconomic reasons. Ultimately, however, investor appetite and market pricing resulted in the suspension of inflation bond issuance.

4.45
International evidence shows that only a few countries continue an active issuance program in price-index debt (Australia, Canada, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Overall, inflation bonds appear to have provided mixed results for debt managers. NZDMO’s suspension of their use is therefore consistent with the lack of clear advantages or disadvantages for maintaining a small amount of issuance (as a percentage of total debt).

4.46
Overall, the debt composition of NZDMO is consistent with similar developed countries within the OECD, and does not include instruments that would be inappropriate for NZDMO to use when balancing risk and cost dynamics.

Identifying and measuring risk

Applying benchmarks to the strategic portfolio

4.47
NZDMO has recently moved to an asset and liability framework to assess performance of parts of the strategic portfolio (that is, monitoring the interest margin between related assets and liabilities within the strategic portfolio) along with developing quasi-tactical portfolios for assets and liabilities that have a degree of active management. These steps have progressively reduced the size of the residual strategic portfolio. Furthermore, the strategic portfolio is expected to continue reducing over time as various assets and liabilities are aligned. Given these changes, NZDMO does not believe that extensive benchmarking or cost/risk analysis is necessary under the asset and liability framework.

4.48
However, it is expected that a significant portion of the portfolio will remain as net debt for some time, with no financial assets linked to it. As a result, limited risk analysis or performance reporting is undertaken with respect to this part of the strategic portfolio. We understand that NZDMO’s intention is that eventually the residual portfolio may be notionally allocated or attributed to financial assets potentially residing outside of NZDMO.

4.49
International comparisons indicate that government borrowers, in the absence of risk measures (such as VaR), often assess performance of their core debt portfolio using benchmarks. Benchmarks can help guide debt managers’ decision-making with respect to trade-off s between expected costs and risks. They can also provide a framework for assessing portfolio performance and policy-setting.²

4.50
However, benchmarks that are not properly formulated or implemented will provide limited support to policy setting and performance measurement. For benchmarks to be successfully applied, they need to be incorporated into the Government’s debt management and overall macroeconomic philosophy, incorporate the constraints within their own market, and be robust enough to withstand a normal range of economic scenarios or cycles.

Non-benchmarking of the strategic portfolio

4.51
NZDMO currently considers that there is no need to benchmark two out of the seven sub-portfolios within the strategic portfolio where matching of asset and liability duration has not occurred. The rationale for not having a benchmark portfolio, which is often usual practice for matched portfolios, is not stated within the current policy framework. It would be useful for the PMP to elaborate that NZDMO has decided not to follow benchmarking given its asset and liability approach.

4.52
Applying benchmarks to the portfolio has been the subject of recommendations from previous reviews of NZDMO’s practices and is alluded to in the PMP. There are a number of arguments that could support the rationale for not having a benchmark portfolio. They include, for example, that it is difficult for NZDMO to determine the appropriate duration benchmark for the residual debt pool. It could also be argued that NZDMO needs to maintain liquidity in benchmark bond issues that will influence the construction of its strategic portfolio. A further argument could be made that the risk management and administrative eff ort involved in measuring and managing activities against a benchmark are not justified in terms of adding value.

Parameters and monitoring of the strategic portfolio

4.53
Leaving aside the rationale for not setting a duration benchmark, it would be useful to at least set broad parameters in the PMP that are associated with the management and monitoring of the residual sub-portfolios within the strategic portfolio where matching has not occurred. Discussions with NZDMO staff indicated that the current duration of the strategic portfolio is not explicitly measured or monitored.

4.54
While not policy, the Technical Appendix of the PMP states that the duration of the portfolio was about 3.2 years in 2000, and that the strategic portfolio should have had a relatively long duration given the duration of the Government’s physical assets.

4.55
This stance is consistent with the debt portfolios of other governments (which typically have durations of close to five years³). Government entities also tend to have portfolios with relatively long durations because they prefer a stable cost of funds (for budgeting purposes) as well as the fact that government physical assets tend to have relatively long economic lives.

4.56
Where actual duration starts to move away from the notional target, then this could provide a trigger for reconsideration of debt issuance and risk management activities.

4.57
At the time of our audit, positions within the quasi-tactical portfolio were excluded from the formal market risk reporting and limits framework as applied within the tactical portfolio. Unacceptable daily volatility would arise in valueadded and VaR measures within the existing portfolio. NZDMO therefore intends to undertake further refinements before considering transferring the quasitactical portfolio into the tactical portfolio.

4.58
We consider that the activities conducted within NZDMO’s quasi-tactical advances desks are consistent with NZDMO’s overall tactical activity (asset and liability mismatch management). This should be recognised in the PMP.

Recommendation 6
We recommend that NZDMO progress the application of benchmarks that allow the matching explicitly or notionally of similar assets and liabilities.

4.59
In the absence of such benchmarks being developed, it would be appropriate for NZDMO to consider setting a national “target duration” for its unmatched subportfolios within the strategic portfolio.

Warehousing of funds

4.60
Excess funds from bond issues are sometimes effectively warehoused in the strategic portfolio until applied to funding requirements. Typically, any interest rate mismatch (funds that are borrowed on a term basis but invested overnight) is synthetically eliminated by interest rate or foreign currency derivatives.

4.61
Some funds that remain within the strategic portfolio are periodically assessed for their ultimate purpose in terms of short-term needs (for example, liquidity management versus longer-term requirements). While these funds are managed within the strategic portfolio, a possible alternative to warehousing the funds would be to transfer the excess funds into the tactical portfolio. The tactical portfolio has the VaR and associated performance measurement frameworks applied to it. This would therefore facilitate the risk capture, identification, and management of the surplus funds in a manner consistent with other liquid assets in the tactical portfolio.

A well-functioning domestic financial market

Background

4.62
The principles for managing the New Zealand dollar debt portfolio include the following:⁴

• Minimise refinancing risk. NZDMO maintains a relatively even maturity profile for term debt across the yield curve to reduce pressure on the domestic bond market when supply increases unexpectedly and to provide the Government with greater flexibility in an environment of fiscal surpluses.
• Promote bond liquidity and minimise the Government’s cost of borrowing. NZDMO builds benchmark bonds of around $3,000 million. When deciding which benchmarks to build up in the current financial year, NZDMO trades off the size and number of benchmarks to be off ered. When issuing debt, NZDMO samples interest rates throughout the year by conducting around 12 auctions of government bonds and weekly auctions of treasury bills.
• Manage interest rate risk to minimise financing costs. NZDMO maintains a mix of fixed rate and floating rate debt and uses interest rate swaps. Inflation-indexed debt makes up a component of the portfolio and is issued when it is cost-effective to do so. NZDMO seeks to reduce price uncertainty and encourage competitive bidding through an efficient auction programme.
• Transparency. Transparency surrounding the Government’s domestic borrowing intentions is enhanced by the publication of the details of the borrowing programme when the annual budget and half-year fiscal updates are released. NZDMO sets out its intended government bond and treasury bill programme and will indicate whether it intends to undertake New Zealand-dollar interest-rate swap transactions. Similarly, NZDMO consults the market before introducing new policies and practices. This reduces uncertainty around the process of policy change.

4.63
Although these principles limit NZDMO’s ability to borrow opportunistically or engage in secondary-market intervention, the possible opportunistic gains are outweighed by the benefits of being transparent.

Promotion of a well-functioning capital market

4.64
Secondary to NZDMO’s debt management objectives are the maintenance and development of an efficient domestic capital market that reduces the cost of capital for private sector borrowers by improving New Zealand’s sovereign creditworthiness.

4.65
An efficient, or deep and liquid, government bond market is characterised by low transaction costs (narrow bids and offers), competitive market processes, a sound market infrastructure, a large investor base, and high substitutability between financial instruments.⁵

4.66
Other evidence of a well-functioning market would be multiple banks and broker entities off ering price making in government bonds, along with the Crown achieving a stable cost of funds, consistent with borrowers similar to New Zealand (“AA+” rated borrowers).

Performance of the government treasury bill and bond market

4.67
In recent years, the New Zealand financial markets have experienced some challenges, in part arising from the continued growth in financial institutions’ balance sheets. As a result, a comparable level of liquidity to be held has also increased. Therefore, New Zealand financial institutions’ demand for holdings of government securities has remained strong, and has meant competing with the strong off shore demand for government securities as part of the carry trade.

4.68
Pressure appeared in the short-term money market in 2005 and 2006, with unusually high and volatile interest rates. The RBNZ identified that both speculative positioning and a shortage of the level of government collateral available to the banks for secured lending purposes resulted in significant supply/ demand imbalances.6 These factors, combined with increased off shore holdings, resulted in a shrinking supply of government securities. Government securities became very expensive to hold.

4.69
The RBNZ implemented its new Liquidity Management Operation framework in early 2006. This resulted in the RBNZ initially increasing the Settlement Cash Level from $20 million to $2,000 million and discontinuing the auto-repo facility, along with acceptance of bank bills and other non-government securities as security as part of the RBNZ’s normal market operations. These changes helped ease short-term cash rates, and resulted in the treasury bill spread substantially narrowing. The effect of these changes was highlighted by the changes in the spread between 3-month treasury bills and bank bills, as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6
Spread between 3-month treasury bills and bank bills 2000-06

Source: RBNZ November 2006 Financial Stability Report

4.70
The measures implemented by the RBNZ to ease short-term interest rate pressure have had an operational effect on NZDMO. The level of treasury bills issued by NZDMO has reduced significantly, and the level of credit advantage (value added) in terms of performance has narrowed.

4.71
However, the off shore demand for government securities remains a challenge, and the shortage of supply is reflected in the statistics gathered by the RBNZ, specifically the domestic inter-bank government bond turnover and off shore government bond holdings. These are shown in Figure 7. The statistics show the effect of foreign investors’ strategy of buy and hold, rather than active turnover of government securities by local investors.

Figure 7
Domestic inter-bank government bond turnover and off shore government bond holdings 1996-2006

Source: RBNZ November 2006 Financial Stability Report

4.72
Figure 7 shows a strong relationship of reduced domestic turnover of government bonds when foreign ownership of bonds increases (and vice-versa). The analysis also suggests that increased foreign demand tends to correlate with strength in the New Zealand dollar, as the last period of high foreign ownership of government bonds occurred during 1997/98 when the New Zealand dollar was above 65 cents against the US dollar (during 2006/07, the average exchange rate was about 65 cents).

Maintenance of the primary and secondary markets for New Zealand dollar government bonds

4.73
NZDMO relies on a number of mechanisms to maintain liquidity in the government stock it issues. These mechanisms include maintaining specific concentrated debt issuance tranches (when the cash position does not always require issuance) and maintaining dialogue with the RBNZ and market participants around potential liquidity issues. It is critical that NZDMO nurtures investor appetite for its bonds to promote a liquid secondary market with low transaction costs.

4.74
This issue has been addressed by some Australian Commonwealth Borrowing Authorities, that appoint and incentivise a dealer panel (typically 5-6 market makers) and off er bonus schemes based on turnover of the issuer’s stock. This arrangement is intended to facilitate the liquidity of the secondary government bond market. Also, quarterly reviews are held to assess dealer performance and include demotion from the panel for ongoing underperformance.

4.75
Other mechanisms that can be used include formal customer surveys to learn whether key financial markets stakeholders have any concerns or issues on which they wish to provide feedback. This type of engagement can assist in understanding customer needs concerning financial transaction execution. A survey would normally encompass all elements where the centralised treasury interfaces with the customer (for example, Operations and middle Office, as well as front Office functions). Often the trend of the scoring of performance across two or more surveys is more illuminating than an absolute measure. Anonymous comments from customers can have a more immediate effect upon assistance provided.

Recommendation 7
We recommend that NZDMO review the mechanisms available to actively engage financial market participants in order to promote a well-functioning government debt market.

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1: Based on information in chapter 2 of the 2004 World Bank publication Sound Practice in Government Debt Management.

2: Based on information in chapter 7 of the 2004 World Bank publication Sound Practice in Government Debt Management.

3: OECD statistical yearbooks, 1996-2005.

4: These principles are based on domestic debt management information from www.nzdmo.govt.nz.

5: Based on information in chapter 9 of the 2004 World Bank publication Sound Practice in Government Debt Management.

6: RBNZ (May 2006), Financial Stability Report.

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